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Using different evaluation targets (i.e., politicians’ pictures, ideological words, items
referring to features attributed to political ingroup/outgroup) we characterized the
intergroup bias among political groups in the Italian context (Study 1-2-3) and tested a
model that may account for the bias itself (Study 3). For all evaluation targets, left-wing
participants - compared to right-wing participants – showed a greater intergroup bias,
expressing more negative emotions toward the outgroup. The process was influenced
by a greater perceived threat of the outgroup. Conversely, right-wing participants
expressed the bias only when presented with ideological words. Our results provide
a detailed description of how intergroup bias in Italy is differently expressed by the two
ideological groups depending on the targets used to represent the political counterpart.
Moreover, the results show that the stronger bias expressed by left-wing participants is
driven by perceived threat of the outgroup.
Keywords: political intergroup bias, ideological conflict hypothesis, personalized politics, perceived threat,
entitativity, agentivity
INTRODUCTION
Humans are social animals that form groups not only to survive in the world, but also to increase
their sense of belonging, security (Correll and Park, 2005) and identity (Tajfel and Turner, 1979).
Social categorization is the process by which people restrict their perception of social objects (Hogg
and Abrams, 1988) and separate what is similar or dissimilar to themselves by coding others as
ingroup vs. outgroup (Tajfel, 1969). Although it typically occurs in an automatic way (Brewer,
1988; Fiske and Neuberg, 1990), social categorization may be influenced by several variables such
as the perceived warmth and competence of others (Ponsi et al., 2016), emotional reactivity (Ponsi
et al., 2017b), self-uncertainty (Wagoner and Hogg, 2016), physical (Peck et al., 2013; Porciello
et al., 2014) and personological similarity (Liuzza et al., 2011, 2013; Porciello et al., 2016), social
interactions (Bufalari et al., 2014; Sacheli et al., 2015), and affect (Isen et al., 1992; Miller et al.,
2010). These variables can in turn affect ethical, economic and social decisions (De Dreu et al.,
2014; Shalvi and De Dreu, 2014; Panasiti et al., 2016; Ponsi et al., 2017a; Azevedo et al., 2018).
It has been found that a seemingly inevitable consequence of being part of a group (natural or
created artificially for experimental purposes) is the so-called intergroup bias (Tajfel, 1969), which
leads one to favor the ingroup and derogate the outgroup through positive/negative evaluations,
emotions and behaviors. While the study of positive bias toward the ingroup has received much
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more attention than the derogation of the outgroup, it has
been reported that the latter mechanism is very important for
characterizing the intergroup bias (Mummendey et al., 1992;
Brewer, 1999; Mummendey and Wenzel, 1999; Brown, 2000;
Hodson et al., 2003; Hogg, 2003; Aquino and Becker, 2005;
Park and Judd, 2005). Studies suggest that the predominance
of one aspect on the other depends on the salience of specific
needs and motivations (Levin and Sidanius, 1999). Outgroup
derogation, often expressed by social and physical distance,
negative emotions, intolerance, low cooperativeness and low
pro-social behaviors (Haidt et al., 2003; Skitka et al., 2005;
Mullen and Skitka, 2006; Morgan et al., 2010), seems to play
a fundamental role in the dynamics of the so-called morality-
based groups. In these groups -such as those surrounding the
issue of abortion (Pro-life vs. Pro-choice)- the intergroup bias
is the result of a differentiation from the “other” that is based
on moral principles (Skitka et al., 2005; Krebs, 2008; Gray and
Wegner, 2009; Horberg et al., 2009; Parker and Janoff-Bulman,
2013). Here, the intergroup bias is predominantly expressed by
outgroup derogation, which can be displayed not only by directly
harming others, but also by refraining from helping them (Weisel
and Böhm, 2015). What seems to drive outgroup derogation for
morality-based groups is the perceived threat of the outgroup
(Parker and Janoff-Bulman, 2013). Importantly for the present
research, in morality-based groups based on political affiliation,
intergroup bias seems to entail a clear outgroup derogation
(Janoff-Bulman, 2009) that can be greater than the one driven
by race (Iyengar and Westwood, 2015). It is worth noticing that
this pattern of results mainly derives from the study of political
groups in contemporary Western context which is dominated by
a natural opposition between two major ideologies: Conservatism
and Liberalism (Heit and Nicholson, 2010). These two ideologies
differ not only in the personality traits their adherents display
(e.g., Liberals more open to experience and Conservatives more
conscientious; Carney et al., 2008), but also in basic and
higher order cognitive mechanisms, such as motivations (Jost
et al., 2004, 2007, 2009; Thórisdóttir and Jost, 2011), emotional
processing (Oxley et al., 2008), attentional orienting (Carraro
et al., 2015), conflict monitoring (Amodio et al., 2007), and
behaviors (e.g., consumption behavior; Fernandes and Mandel,
2014; Shi et al., 2017).
Importantly, the two groups also differ in how they shape their
morality: Conservatives tend more toward ingroup loyalty, while
Liberals seem more heavily reliant on individual motives related
to harm/care (Graham et al., 2009). System Justification Theory
suggests that these cognitive, personality and moral differences
combine to explain why Conservatives show more prejudice
compared to Liberals, who, conversely, are thought to be more
open minded, favorable to diversity (Chirumbolo et al., 2004; De
Zavala et al., 2010; Thórisdóttir and Jost, 2011) and sympathetic
toward outgroup minorities (Robinson et al., 1995; Farwell and
Weiner, 2000). Thus, while these studies hint at the existence of
a difference in the level of prejudice shown by the two political
groups (Jost et al., 2004; Jost, 2017), the so called Ideological
Conflict Hypothesis suggests that Liberals and Conservatives are
equally prejudiced since they both tend to favor those who share
their own opinions and values, and derogate those who are in
contrast with such values (Chambers et al., 2013; Brandt et al.,
2014; Crawford, 2014). In this view, prejudice is one of the
possible strategies a group can use to defend its own worldview
when it is threatened (Brandt et al., 2014). Results from three
independent laboratories testing this hypothesis showed that
when facing a political counterpart openly opposed to their
values – and thus perceived as threatening – both Liberals
and Conservatives appear to be biased (i.e., they show equal
dislike, political intolerance and willingness to discriminate;
Brandt et al., 2014).
It should be noted that, differently from countries in which
the vast majority of the studies reported above was conducted
(mainly United States and United Kingdom), Italy has a multi-
party political system, in which tracing a net divide between
Conservative and Liberal political parties is more difficult.
Nonetheless, in the last 25 years – with the disappearance of
the dominant catch-all party “Democrazia Cristiana,” in which
elements of both conservative and liberal ideologies were present
(Paolucci, 2008) – two big coalitions emerged with a more
conservative ideology in the center-right coalition and more
liberal in the center-left. We are aware that a perfect overlap
of Italian left and right-wing with Liberalism and Conservatism
respectively might still be inaccurate. Thus, we believe that using
the left- vs. right-wing dichotomy is more suitable for the Italian
context and will refer to this in the following.
In the light of this multi-party political system, when collecting
their political orientation we asked participants to self-define
as right or left-wing. In doing so we asked them to answer by
referring to their ideology and not the party they were voting for.
This selection procedure was adopted also because some political
parties in Italy (such as “Movimento 5 Stelle”) declare not to
follow any of the two predominant ideologies and thus selecting
participants according to the parties they were voting for could
have been misleading.
To characterize the intergroup bias among political groups
in the contemporary Italian context (from September 2015 to
May 2016, i.e., when a left-wing government was in power), we
presented to right-wing and left-wing Italian voters pictures of
left and right-wing Italian politicians (Study 1), words related to
left and right-wing ideologies (Study 2), and items referring to left
and right-wing people (Study 3). We reasoned that varying the
type of stimulus (pictures of politicians, ideological words, and
items referring to the two political groups) could affect different
processes and thus change the expression of the bias.
Indeed, it has been observed that - through mechanisms
such as perceived voter-leader similarity (Liuzza et al., 2011,
2013; Cazzato et al., 2015) and attribution of authority and
power (Porciello et al., 2016) – right-wing people tend to be
more influenced than the left-wing ones by the presentation of
their political leaders. Therefore, we expected that (Hypothesis
1) the use of pictures of politicians (Study 1) would lead to a
higher intergroup bias (especially ingroup favoritism) in right-
wing participants. In contrast, since ideological words (Study
2) might convey directly political ingroup–outgroup distinction
without the mediation of the aforementioned processes, we
expected that (Hypothesis 2) the expression of the intergroup bias
would follow the predictions of the ideological conflict hypothesis
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(Brandt et al., 2014), with the same level of prejudice for both
groups.
Finally, by presenting items related to participants’ political
ingroup and outgroup (Study 3), we expected that the lack of
personalization and authority cues would lead to confirm the
results of Study 2 and extend the characterization of the bias not
only at the emotional but also at the cognitive and behavioral
level (Hypothesis 3). Moreover, to test what are the possible
causes of the process that lead to the political intergroup bias,
we measured certain factors that have been observed to play a
role in the expression of intergroup bias either in natural and
minimal groups (Gaertner and Schopler, 1998; Rubini et al., 2007;
Effron and Knowles, 2015). Specifically, by relying on studies
(those supporting the ideological conflict hypothesis and those
on morality-based groups) that enlighten the role of perceived
threat of the outgroup in the emerging of the bias (Janoff-
Bulman, 2009; Parker and Janoff-Bulman, 2013; Wetherell et al.,
2013; Brandt et al., 2014), we measured whether left and right-
wing participants would exhibit a different level of perceived
threat toward the outgroup and whether this could intervene
in the expression of the bias. We expected that (Hypothesis
3.1) the more the outgroup was perceived as threatening the
higher was the intergroup bias, expressed in particular in the
form of outgroup derogation (Dovidio and Gaertner, 2010). In
this vein, we also investigated whether entitativity (the extent
to which a group is perceived as a group; Campbell, 1958) and
agentivity (the extent to which a group is perceived as able to
act as a group to achieve its goals; Abelson et al., 1998) could
play a role and we expected that (Hypothesis 3.2) perceiving
an outgroup as entitative and agentive could trigger a higher
outgroup derogation. Conversely, perceiving the ingroup as
entitative and agentive, and therefore able to defend its members,
could enhance ingroup favoritism.
STUDY 1
In Study 1 we asked left and right-wing Italian participants to (i)
recognize, (ii) politically categorize and (iii) emotionally evaluate
(by providing the valence of the elicited emotions) pictures of
Italian politicians from both left and right-wing parties. Due to
prior literature showing Conservatives to be more sensitive to
authority – especially that of ingroup leaders (Liuzza et al., 2011;
Porciello et al., 2016) – we expected right-wing participants to
express more positive emotions than Liberals toward what they
categorized as ingroup.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Sixty six participants (33 females; age: M = 25.66 years,
SD = ±7.15) were recruited by posting an invitation to complete
an online survey regarding the categorization and evaluation of
certain politicians. Sample size was determined following similar
studies of our research group on social categorization (Ponsi
et al., 2016). All the participants were Italian. Thirty one were
right-wing and thirty five left-wing. The experimental procedures
were approved by the independent Ethics Committee of the
Santa Lucia Foundation in Rome (Scientific Institute for Research
Hospitalization and Health Care) and were in accordance with
the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki.
Materials and Procedure
The questionnaire was built and run through the online survey
editor SurveyMonkeyTM. Before starting the survey, participants
were asked to read and accept the informed consent document
by clicking with the mouse on a link which redirected them to
the survey. Participants were presented with 58 pictures of Italian
politicians in a randomized order, 29 left and 29 right-wing, with
17 males and 12 females in each group (for a complete list of the
stimuli see Appendix). For each stimulus we asked participants
(1) whether they recognized the politician (Recognition: “Do
you recognize the person in the picture?”). Participants could
either answer “Yes” or “No.” Those who responded affirmatively
were asked to write the politician’s surname in order to ensure
their recognition. Participants were then asked to (2) politically
categorize the politician in the picture (Political Categorization:
“How would you politically categorize the person in the picture?”).
They replied using a four-step scale (i.e., “Right-wing, Center-
right, Center-left, Left-wing”). Finally, we asked participants (3)
to rate the emotions evoked by the politician (Valence: “What
kind of emotions does the person evoke in you?”). Participants
replied by using a 9-point Likert scale (i.e., “1 = Extremely
negative emotions; 9 = Extremely positive emotions”). Participants
who had not recognized the stimulus were allowed to skip
the questions concerning valence and political categorization.
This measure was our principal dependent variable both in this
study and in Study 2. Although consisting of a single item,
methodological research in psychology showed no substantial
differences in terms of reliability between single-item and
multiple-items measures (Wanous and Hudy, 2001; Dolbier et al.,
2005). Importantly, although we checked for participants’ ability
to assign politicians to the correct political group (accuracy
of 95%; SD = ±0.18), we decided to use their response
as a predictor rather than the actual political orientation of
the politicians. The claims of this study are thus merely
correlational, not causal, as both our dependent and independent
variables are built on participants’ responses (i.e., they are not
experimentally manipulated). After evaluating all politicians’
images, participants were asked to provide their demographic
information (age, gender, nationality, occupation, education
level, and country) and Political Orientation (henceforth named
as Group) by indicating their ideology on a four-step scale (i.e.,
Right-wing, Center-right, Center-left, Left-wing).
Analysis and Results
Data analysis was performed with R, a free software
programming language and software environment for statistical
computing (R Core Team, 2013). Trials in which participants
did not recognize the politician were excluded from the analysis
(Total valid trials = 62%; range: min = 13%, max = 100% of valid
trials per subject). We then performed a multilevel mixed linear
regression analysis (LMM or “mixed-effects models”; Pinheiro
and Bates, 2000; Garson, 2013) through the package lme4
Version 1.1–5 (Bates et al., 2014). Unlike traditional statistical
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FIGURE 1 | Mixed models interaction between Political Categorization and Group with politicians as stimuli. Political Categorization is shown on the X-axis. The
slope was significantly different from 0 for left-wing participants (p < 0.001) but not for right-wing ones (p > 0.05). More specifically, left-wing participants expressed
more positive emotions toward the stimuli categorized as ingroup and more negative emotions toward the outgroup stimuli compared to right-wing ones. The
shaded bands represent 95% confidence intervals. ∗p < 0.001.
methods, LMM are suitable for (a) analyzing hierarchical data
structures (i.e., in which not all levels of a categorical factor
co-occur at all levels of another categorical factor); (b) analyzing
the whole data set (not just the mean observations for each
subject and condition) to better evaluate the data variations
that variance-style analyses (ANOVA) often leave out; (c)
accounting for the non-independence of observations with
correlated error; (d) separately treating the effects caused by
the experimental manipulation (fixed effects) and those that
were not (random effects) (Pinheiro and Bates, 2000). We used
Valence as the dependent measure of our model. The fixed
effects were the Political Categorization of the stimulus, the
Group and their respective interactions. Political categorization
of the stimulus was recoded as follows: if the categorization
of the stimulus made by the participant matched his/her
Group (i.e., left vs. right-wing), that stimulus was considered as
ingroup (e.g., a stimulus categorized as left-wing by a left-wing
participant was considered as ingroup). If the categorization
did not match, that stimulus was considered as outgroup (e.g.,
a stimulus categorized as right-wing by a left-wing participant
was considered as outgroup). We considered the random
intercept over participants and the random slope of Political
categorization over participants as random factors. Statistical
significance of fixed effects was determined using type III Wald
F tests with Kenward–Roger degrees of freedom (Kenward and
Roger, 1997) and the Anova function from R’s car package.
Post hoc pairwise comparisons (FDR corrected) were performed
using least squares contrasts (lsc), as employed in R’s lsmeans
package. The analysis revealed a significant Group × Political
Categorization interaction F(1,70.025) = 48.31, p < 0.001.
Post hoc analysis showed the slope of left-wing participants
to be significantly different from zero (b = 3.11, SE = 0.26,
df = 68.75, t.ratio = −11.94, p < 0.001), while that of right-
wing participants was not (b = 0.41, SE = 0.28, df = 71.09,
t.ratio = −1.43, p = 0.16). This indicates that, unlike left-wing,
right-wing participants expressed no difference in emotional
valence when evaluating ingroup or outgroup stimuli (see
Figure 1). Furthermore, left-wing participants expressed more
positive emotions toward ingroup stimuli (M = 5.17; SE = 0.23)
than right-wing participants [M = 4.06; SE = 0.25; Mean
difference = −1.1, SE = 0.35; t(65.98) = −3.177, p = 0.01,
r = 0.36]. Left-wing participants also made more negative
evaluations of the stimuli they had categorized as right-wing
(M = 2.08; SE = 0.18) than right-wing participants did with
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stimuli they had categorized as left-wing [M = 3.65; SE = 0.20;
Mean difference = 1.58, SE = 0.27, t(69.59) = 5.83, p < 0.001,
r = 0.57].
Discussion
Despite our expectations for a higher intergroup bias among
right-wing participants, results from this first study show that
only left-wing ones express the bias. Specifically, we found
that, while right-wing participants’ emotions toward the stimuli
are not related to the political categorization they make, left-
wing ones express significantly different emotions according to
the way they categorize the stimuli. When facing a stimulus
that they recognize as belonging to their political ingroup or
outgroup, left-wing participants tend to express more positive
or negative emotions respectively when compared to right-
wing ones. It should be noted, however, that this study was
conducted while a left-wing – and not right – government
was in power. For this reason, right-wing leaders’ authority
might have been less strong and effective in leading right-wing
participants’ bias, in line with what was found by Porciello et al.
(2016).
STUDY 2
Study 2 was identical to Study 1 except for the fact that
words were used as stimuli instead of politicians’ pictures. The
words were chosen to represent either ingroup or outgroup
by conveying a right or left-wing ideology. Differently from
politicians’ pictures, words refer to ideologies without involving
the process of personalization or the different levels of
sensitivity to authority. We thus expected that the ideological
contrast contained in the words would lead right and left-
wing participants to a similar expression of intergroup bias, as
predicted by the ideological conflict hypothesis (Brandt et al.,
2014). In particular, we expected both groups to express more
positive emotions for the words that they categorized as ingroup
and more negative emotions for the words they categorized as
outgroup stimuli.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Eighty two participants (52 left-wings and 30 right-wings) were
recruited by posting an invitation to complete an online survey
regarding the categorization and evaluation of political words.
FIGURE 2 | Mixed models interaction between Political Categorization and Group with ideological words as stimuli. Political Categorization is shown on the X-axis.
The slopes for both left and right-wing participants differed from 0 (all ps < 0.003), but left-wing participants showed significantly more negative emotions toward the
outgroup and more positive emotions toward the ingroup compared to right-wing ones. The shaded bands represent 95% confidence intervals. ∗p < 0.003.
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To have a better balance in the size of the two groups we
selected through a random procedure a subsample of left-wing
participants. Specifically, we generated a list of numbers ranging
from 1 to 52 and randomly assigned them to our left-wing
participants. Participants having a number comprised between 1
and 30 were then selected. Therefore, the final sample consisted
of 30 left-wing and 30 right-wing participants (33 females; age
M = 28.96, SD = ±9.67), in keeping with Study 1 and previous
studies of this research group on social categorization (Ponsi
et al., 2016). All the participants were Italian. The experimental
procedures were approved by the independent Ethics Committee
of the Santa Lucia Foundation in Rome (Scientific Institute
for Research Hospitalization and Health Care) and were in
accordance with the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki.
Materials and Procedure
The questionnaire was built and run through the online survey
editor SurveyMonkeyTM. Before starting the survey, participants
were asked to read and accept the informed consent document
by clicking with the mouse on a link which redirected them to the
survey. Forty six words were selected from specific political scales
such as the Right-Wing Authoritarianism – RWA (Altemeyer,
1998) – and the Social Dominance Orientation – SDO – (Tilly
et al., 2001). The words were selected and categorized on the basis
of the ideological policy expressed – half representing a right-
wing, half a left-wing ideology – and tested by the questionnaire
items (see Appendix for a complete list of the stimuli). The words
did not differ for lexical frequency [Mright = 1.45, SDright =±0.80;
Mleft = 1.51, SDleft =±0.80; t(44) =−0.284, p = 0.81] or character
length [Mright = 1.00, SDright =±0.09; Mleft = 0.98, SDleft =±0.14;
t(44) = 0.520, p = 0.60]. Both the order in which the words were
presented and the questions appeared within the survey were
randomized.
Similarly to Study 1, for each stimulus we asked participants
to (1) politically categorize the ideological word (Political
Categorization: “Which ideology do you think represents the
word above?”). Participants replied by using a four-option scale
(i.e., “Right-wing, Left-wing, Both of them, Neither of them”).
Participants were then asked (2) to rate the emotions evoked
by the word (Valence: “What kind of emotions does the word
evoke in you?”). Here replies were made by using a 9-point
Likert scale (i.e., “1 = Extremely negative emotions; 9 = Extremely
positive emotions”). As in Study 1, this measure was employed as
dependent variable. Again, although we checked that participants
were able to correctly assign the words to the corresponding
political group (accuracy of 95%; SD = ±0.18), we decided to
use their responses as a predictor, rather than the actual political
orientation of the words. Thus, the claims also of this study
are merely correlational, not causal. Finally, we asked the same
demographic information and question on Political Orientation
(henceforth called Group) as in Study 1.
Analysis and Results
Trials in which participants could not assign the word to a
specific political category (i.e., they indicated that the word
was representing both or neither of the two ideologies) were
excluded from the analysis (Valid trials = 57.1%; range: min = 6%,
max = 95% of valid trials per subject). We performed the
same linear mixed model as in Study 1, revealing a significant
Group x Political Categorization interaction [F(1,58.412) = 34.34,
p < 0.001]. Post hoc analysis showed that the slopes of both left
(b = 3.56, SE = 0.31, df = 55.11, t.ratio = −11.24, p < 0.001)
and right-wing participants (b = 0.86, SE = 0.33, df = 61.64,
t.ratio = −2.59, p < 0.001] were different from zero, indicating
that with this type of stimuli (i.e., ideological words) both
groups showed an intergroup bias. Once again, however, this bias
was stronger for left than right-wing participants. Specifically,
left-wing participants expressed more positive emotions toward
the stimuli they categorized as belonging to their ingroup
(M = 7.59; SE = 0.24) than right-wing participants (M = 6.64,
SE = 0.18); (b = −0.95, SE = 0.26, df = 56.51, t.ratio = −3.61,
p = 0.003; r = 0.43) (see Figure 2). Furthermore, left-wing
participants made less positive evaluations of the stimuli they
had categorized as belonging to the outgroup (M = 4.02;
SE = 0.22) than right-wing participants did (M = 5.77; SE = 0.33);
(b = 1.74, SE = 0.33, df = 57.35, t.ratio = 5.20, p < 0.001,
r = 0.56).
Discussion
Changing the nature of the stimuli (i.e., using ideological words
instead of politicians’ pictures) did not significantly change the
pattern of results found in Study 1, but it did highlight a new,
interesting, element that was in line with our hypothesis. While
stronger in left-wing, intergroup bias was also found among
right-wing participants. It seems that presenting ideological
words makes the ideological conflict between the two groups
more salient, leading them to express intergroup bias. However,
again this conflict seems to affect left more than right-wing
participants.
STUDY 3
Study 3 was performed with the aim of (i) replicating the findings
of Studies 1–2 and (ii) revealing potential influencal factors that
could play a role in the different expression of the bias between
left and right-wing participants. Participants were presented
with items that referred to people representing their political
ingroup/outgroup (namely, left and right-wing people). Because
of the lack of personalization and authority cue, we expected to
replicate the findings of Study 2 regarding the emotional bias
and to find additional evidence for cognitive and behavioral bias
in both left and right-wing participants. Moreover, literature
on morality-based groups and research on ideological conflict
hypothesis have underlined how the interaction between two
opposing groups is often characterized by the presence of a
perceived threat of the outgroup (Parker and Janoff-Bulman,
2013; Brandt et al., 2014). In addition, when perceiving a group
as such (entitativity) that group could become more threatening,
especially if attributed with the ability to act (agentivity), as
its capacity for harm increases. This perception often leads to
intergroup bias expressed by a more positive attitude toward
the ingroup and a more negative attitude toward the outgroup
(Dovidio and Gaertner, 2010). We thus investigated whether
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these variables (i.e., entitativity, agentivity and perceived threat)
could play a role in the process that leads to the emergence of the
bias.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Seventy one participants (41 left-wing and 30 right-wing) were
recruited by posting an invitation to complete an online survey
regarding political opinions and evaluations. The same random
selection procedure used in Study 2 was employed here to
select a subsample of 30 left-wing participants. The final sample
consisted of 30 left-wing and 30 right-wing participants (41
females, age M = 26.80; SD = ±5.44). All participants were
Italian. The experimental procedures were approved by the
independent Ethics Committee of the Santa Lucia Foundation
in Rome (Scientific Institute for Research Hospitalization and
Health Care) and were in accordance with the 1964 Declaration
of Helsinki.
Materials and Procedure
The questionnaire was built and run through the online survey
editor SurveyMonkeyTM. Before starting the survey, participants
were asked to read and accept the informed consent document
by clicking with the mouse on a link which redirected them
to the survey. We asked participants the same demographic
information and the same question on Political Orientation
(henceforth called as Group). Depending on the answer to this
question, they were directed to a specific survey, one for left-wing
and one for right-wing participants. The only difference between
the two was the measure of perceived threat, which was adapted
for their respective outgroup. Then, participants were asked
to answer questions on political opinions and evaluations that
measured entitativity, agentivity, and perceived threat as related
to their political ingroup and/or outgroup (see Appendix for a
complete list of the items). We also measured their intergroup
bias on three domains (see Measures paragraph for a more
detailed description). Items for each measure were presented in
a randomized order.
Measures
Entitativity of both the ingroup and the outgroup was assessed
with 8 items (adapted by Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2007) asking
participants to express their agreement or disagreement on a 7-
point scale (“1 = Strongly disagree; 7 = Strongly agree”). “How
much group unity do you think left/right-wing people feel?” and
“How much do left/right-wing people interact with one another?”
are two examples of the items.
Agentivity is a specific aspect of entitativity related to the
ability to act as a group. It was assessed for both the ingroup
and outgroup with four items (adapted by Spencer-Rodgers
et al., 2007), in which participants were asked to express their
agreement or disagreement with the sentences on a 7-point scale
(“1 = Strongly disagree; 7 = Strongly agree”). “To what extent
are left/right-wing people able to act collectively?” and “To what
extent are left/right-wing people able to achieve their goals?” are
two examples of the items.
Perceived threat toward the outgroup was assessed with five
items adapted from Schmid and Muldoon (2015). In order to
adjust this measure to the others, and to have a more sensible
tool, we decided to use a 7-point scale instead of the original
5-point scale to assess participants’ agreement or disagreement
with the items (“1 = Strongly disagree; 7 = Strongly agree”). “I feel
threatened if left/right-wing are in power in Italy” and “When I see
left/right-wing symbols I feel as though my identity is under threat”
are two examples of the items.
We also measured the Intergroup Bias on three different
dimensions: emotional, cognitive and behavioral. Again, each
measure was taken for the political ingroup and outgroup (i.e.,
left/right-wing).
Emotional Intergroup bias was assessed with the General
Evaluation Scale, a feeling thermometer taken from Wright
et al. (1997). This measure is composed of 6 bipolar noun
pairs separated by a 7-point scale. Participants were asked to
express their feelings toward an ingroup (Emotion Ingroup) or
outgroup (Emotion Outgroup) person. Examples of these pairs
were warmth-coldness and negativity-positivity.
Cognitive Intergroup bias was assessed with 12 traits taken
from Chambers and Melnyk (2006). Participants were asked to
indicate how much they thought each trait represented a person
of the ingroup (Cognition Ingroup) or outgroup (Cognition
Outgroup) on a 10-point scale (“1 = Not at all; 10 = Very much”).
Examples of these traits were Intelligent, Honest, Immoral and
Radical.
Behavioral Intergroup bias was assessed with two items. One
of these items – again taken from Wright and colleagues (Wright
et al., 1997) – asked the participants to decide how they would
distribute 500 euro between a left/right-wing person. As this
measure, in our opinion, only took the ingroup favoritism aspect
of the bias into account, we decided to create a second item
which could address the behavioral outgroup derogation as well.
Participants were thus asked to decide how they would take 500
euro from a left/right-wing person. Participants were reminded
for both measures that the total amount given or taken away
had to be 500 euro. Finally, Political Orientation (Group) was
measured as in Study 1 and Study 2.
Analysis and Results
The analysis was conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics 22 and
STATISTICA 7 softwares. Since we did not have multiple trials
per condition per participant in this experiment, but single
measurements per construct per participant, there was no need
to use mixed models analysis. All our dependent measures
were normally distributed except for the measure of Emotional
Intergroup bias (ingroup and outgroup) [Kolmogorov–Smirnov
d(60) = 0.145, p < 0.20], which had four outliers. Outlier
participants were defined as those presenting mean values
above ± 2.5 standard deviations from the grand mean of all
participants in each single condition, and recoded by using
the mean value of the respective condition ± 2.5 standard
deviations as indicated by Field (2009). Separate 2 × 2 analysis of
variance (ANOVA) with Target (ingroup vs. outgroup) as within-
subject factor and Group (left vs. right-wing) as between-subject
factor were performed on Entitativity, Agentivity, Emotional
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FIGURE 3 | Agentivity, Entitativity, Perceived threat. Comparisons of the mean scores between left and right-wing participants on ingroup/outgroup Agentivity,
ingroup/outgroup Entitativity and Perceived threat of the outgroup. The only significant comparison between left and right-wing participants was on Perceived threat
of the outgroup, with higher scores for former compared to the latter. ∗p < 0.001.
Intergroup Bias, Cognitive Intergroup Bias and Behavioral
Intergroup Bias. Post hoc comparisons were conducted, when
necessary, by means of the Duncan test. Finally, independent
sample T-test was performed on Perceived Threat of the
outgroup as dependent variable and Group (left vs. right-wing)
as between-subject factor.
Entitativity results
This scale had a high reliability both for the ingroup (Cronbach’s
α = 0.89) and the outgroup (Cronbach’s α = 0.86). The ANOVA
on Entitativity revealed no main effects of Target [F(1,58) = 0.003,
p = 0.95, η2p = 0.00] or Group [F(1,58) = 0.809, p = 0.37, η2p = 0.01]
and no Target × Group interaction [F(1,58) = 2.141, p = 0.14,
η2p = 0.03], indicating that the two groups did not differ in their
perception of ingroup vs. outgroup entitativity (see Figure 3).
Agentivity results
This scale had a high reliability for the ingroup (Cronbach’s
α = 0.83) and a medium reliability for the outgroup (Cronbach’s
α = 0.71). The ANOVA on Agentivity revealed no main effects
of Target [F(1,58) = 0.609, p = 0.43, η2p = 0.01] or Group
[F(1,58) = 0.738, p = 0.39, η2p = 0.01] and no Target × Group
interaction [F(1,58) = 1.147, p = 0.28, η2p = 0.01], indicating that
the two groups did not differ in their perception of ingroup vs.
outgroup agentivity (see Figure 3).
Perceived threat results
This scale had a good reliability (Cronbach’s α = 0.74). The
independent sample t-test showed left-wing participants to
be more threatened by the outgroup (M = 4.30, SE = 0.22;
SD = ±1.23) compared to right-wing participants (M = 3.22,
SE = 0.21; SD = ±1.17) [t(1,58) = −3.471, p < 0.001, r = 0.41]
(see Figure 3).
Emotional intergroup bias results
This scale had a high reliability for the ingroup (Cronbach’s
α = 0.93) and the outgroup (Cronbach’s α = 0.95). The ANOVA
on Emotional Intergroup Bias revealed a main effect of Target
[F(1,58) = 28.700, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.33] with the emotions toward
the outgroup as more negative than those toward the ingroup and
a main effect of Group [F(1,58) = 7.287, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.11]
with left-wing participants reporting more intense emotions
compared to right-wing participants. The interaction was also
significant [F(1,58) = 13.443, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.18], revealing, in
particular, that left-wing participants expressed significantly less
positive (and so more negative) emotions toward the outgroup
than right-wing participants did (p< 0.001). Post hoc analysis on
emotions toward the ingroup revealed no differences between the
two groups (p = 0.20) (see Figure 4).
Cognitive intergroup bias results
This scale had a medium-low reliability for the ingroup
(Cronbach’s α = 0.67) and the outgroup (Cronbach’s α = 0.64).
The ANOVA on Cognitive Intergroup Bias revealed a main effect
of Target [F(1,58) = 8.011, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.12] with more
negative evaluation of the outgroup compared to the ingroup, but
no main effect of Group [F(1,58) = 0.663, p = 0.41, η2p = 0.01].
The Target × Group interaction showed to be significant
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FIGURE 4 | Intergroup bias on Emotions, Cognition and Behavior. Comparisons of the mean scores between left and right-wing participants on the three measures
of intergroup bias: emotions, cognition and behavior. A significant difference between the two groups was found in emotions and cognitions (all ps < 0.03), but not in
behavior (p = 0.79). This last measure was indexed in Donation using the formula ingroup donation – outgroup donation and in Deprivation using the formula ingroup
deprivation – outgroup deprivation. ∗p < 0.03.
[F(1,58) = 8.466, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.12], again revealing that left-
wing participants made significantly less positive evaluations of
the outgroup (M = 5.05, SD = ±0.79) with respect to the ingroup
(M = 5.67, SD = ±0.88) (p = 0.03) than right-wing participants
did (outgroup: M = 5.51, SD = ±0.84; ingroup: M = 5.50,
SD = ±0.67) (see Figure 4).
Behavioral intergroup bias results
The ANOVA on Behavioral Intergroup Bias revealed no main
effects of Target [F(1,58) = 2.077, p = 0.15, η2p = 0.03] or Group
[F(1,58) = 0.031, p = 0.86, η2p = 0.00] or Target × Group
interaction [F(1,58) = 0.06, p = 0.79, η2p = 0.00], indicating that
there was no difference among the two groups in the way they
behave toward the ingroup or the outgroup (see Figure 4).
Correlations
Bivariate correlations were computed between the variables of
interest. The accepted alpha level of the p-value was Bonferroni
corrected for the maximum number of comparisons for each
variable: 0.05/3 = 0.017.
Results indicated that, while there was an inverse relationship
between Perceived Threat and Emotion outgroup [r(60) =−0.50,
p < 0.001], this relationship was not significant with Cognition
outgroup [r(60) = −0.06, p = 0.62], indicating that threat seems
to be involved at an emotional level of information processing
related to the outgroup, rather than at a cognitive level. Moreover,
Emotional bias toward the outgroup had no other relationships,
neither with Agentivity [r(60) = 0.19, p = 0.14) nor with
Entitativity [r(60) = 0.16, p = 0.20].
Differently, Cognition outgroup had a positive relationship
with Agentivity [r(60) = 0.36, p = 0.004] but not with Entitativity
[r(60) = 0.29, p > 0.017].
In addition, we tested correlations between Perceived Threat,
Agentivity and Entitativity. Results showed Perceived Threat to
have a significant (and positive) relationship with Agentivity
[r(60) = 0.34, p = 0.007], but not with Entitativity [r(60) = 0.22,
p = 0.09], indicating that a group can be perceived as threatening
not because of its “groupness,” but because of its potential to act
(see Figure 5).
Mediation analysis
Since the two political groups differed in Perceived Threat of
the outgroup in Emotional and Cognitive Intergroup Bias we
used mediation analysis to assess whether the effect of Group on
intergroup bias toward the outgroup (i.e., the dependent variable)
was mediated by Perceived Threat. Moreover, although the two
groups did not differ either in entitativity and agentivity, we
run a mediation analysis also with Entitativty and Agentivity
as mediators of the relationship Group and Emotional (and
Cognitive) Intergroup bias. The product-of-coefficients strategy
with bootstrapping was used to test strength and significance of
the indirect effect (Preacher and Hayes, 2004; Preacher et al.,
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FIGURE 5 | Correlations matrix among Emotion, Cognition, Agentivity, Entitativity, and Perceived Threat toward the outgroup. r Pearson’s coefficients are reported.
N = 60; ∗∗p < 0.017, corrected for multiple comparisons. Two-tailed pairwise correlation.
FIGURE 6 | (A) Shows the Mediation model with Group, Perceived Threat and Emotions Outgroup. The predictor variable Group was coded 1 for right and 2 for
left-wing participants. This means that an increase of 1 political orientation – namely, being left-wing – indicates a decrease in positive emotions toward the outgroup
(and thus an increase in negative ones). The direct path remained significant after inserting Perceived Threat, but the effect size decreased from –1.20 to –0.85,
p < 0.01. The indirect effect of X on Y mediated by M was significantly different from 0 (B = –0.34, Boot Se.1592, BootLLCI –0.7030, BootULCI –0.1056, p = 0.02).
(B) Shows Mediation model with Group, Perceived Threat and Cognition Outgroup. The predictor variable Group was coded 1 for right and 2 for left-wing
participants. Thus, an increase of 1 political orientation – namely, being left-wing – indicates a decrease in positive traits assigned to the outgroup (and an increase of
negative ones). The path from the mediator to the dependent variable was not significant p > 0.05. The direct path was significant, but the indirect path was not
(B = 0.0414, Boot SE.1097, BootLLCI –0.1831, BootULCI.2573). ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01.
2007). In doing so we used the PROCESS macro implemented
for IBM SPSS (Hayes, 2012).
Mediation model with emotional intergroup bias as
dependent variable
We first determined that Group significantly predicted the
hypothesized first mediator (Perceived Threat of the outgroup)
[b = 1.08, p = 0.001, 95% Confidence Interval (CI)]. Then
we tested that Emotion outgroup was predicted by using
participants’ Group (left vs. right-wing). The regression was
significant (b = −1.20, p < 0.001, 95% CI), and this relationship
remained significant even after inserting Perceived Threat as
mediator (b =−0.85, p = 0.002, 95% CI), but with a weaker effect,
which indicates a partial mediation in the model. The 95% CI for
the indirect path ranged from −0.7492 to −0.1120, indicating
that the indirect effect was significantly different from zero at
p< 0.05 (see Figure 6). This result suggests that Perceived Threat
plays a crucial mediating role in the relationship between the two
political Groups and the emotional aspect of the intergroup bias.
Conversely, the same model did not show any indirect effect
of entitativity (Lower Confidence Interval = −0.1235; Upper
Confidence Interval = 0.1516) or agentivity (Lower Confidence
Interval = −0.1545; Upper Confidence Interval = 0.1571),
indicating that these two factors did not play a role in modulating
the emotional aspect of the intergroup bias depending on the
political orientation of our participants.
Mediation model with cognitive intergroup bias as dependent
variable
As above, Group predicted Perceived Threat (b = 1.08,
p = 0.001, 95% CI). Cognition outgroup was regressed on
Group and showed a significant relationship (b = −0.46,
p = 0.03), even after inserting Perceived threat as mediator
(b = −0.50, p = 0.03). The indirect path was not significant,
as indicated by the 95% CI ranging from −0.1661 to 0.2792
with p > 0.05 (see Figure 6). Thus, Perceived Threat
did not play any mediating role in this model. Similarly,
as showed by their non-significant indirect effects, neither
entitativity ((Lower Confidence Interval = −0.1290; Upper
Confidence Interval = 0.1768) nor agentivity (Lower Confidence
Interval = −0.1841; Upper Confidence Interval = 0.1750) played
a role in this process. This suggests that, differently than for
emotional bias, other variables not investigated here could
account for the differences in cognitive intergroup bias between
the two groups.
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Discussion
In this third study we tested whether the pattern of results found
in the previous two studies could be altered by the presentation
of items referring to participants’ political ingroup and outgroup
as stimuli. We also explored the intergroup bias at an emotional,
cognitive and behavioral level. Moreover, we explored whether
variables such as entitativity and agentivity of the ingroup and
outgroup, as well as threat perception of the outgroup, could
influence the expression of the intergroup bias.
Left-wing participants expressed intergroup bias while
right-wing ones did not, as in Study 1. The bias emerged
not only at an emotional level, but also at the cognitive
one, while no differences were found at a behavioral level.
More specifically, while the two groups did not differ in
their cognitive and emotional evaluations of the ingroup,
left-wing participants expressed significantly more negative
emotions toward – and worse cognitive evaluations of – the
outgroup compared to right-wing participants. Mediation
analysis showed that perceived threat of the outgroup
influenced the effect in the emotional domain, but not in
the cognitive one. This suggests that other latent factors
could contribute to the explanation of this phenomenon. In
contrast with our expectations, those factors were neither
entitativity nor agentivity. Indeed, the ANOVA showed no
differences between the two groups, either for the ingroup or
outgroup.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In three different studies we investigated the political intergroup
bias showed by left and right-wing participants in the
contemporary Italian context. As a main element of novelty
we used different types of stimuli to represent the political
target of evaluations with in mind the idea that changing
nature of the political target could affect the expression of the
intergroup bias. Classical studies indicate that Conservatives,
because of their motivational and epistemic motives rely more
often on stereotypes and express more prejudice toward other
groups than Liberals (Chirumbolo et al., 2004; De Zavala et al.,
2010). However, there is also evidence to suggest that both
groups are equally capable of expressing prejudice toward groups
that do not share their values or opinions, and that they
perceive as a threat to their worldview (Chambers et al., 2013;
Brandt et al., 2014). Motivated by the fact that both top–
down and bottom–up mechanisms related to political perception
can reciprocally affect each other (Castelli and Carraro, 2011;
Liuzza et al., 2011; Alabastro et al., 2013; Porciello et al.,
2016), we presented different types of stimuli as categorization
targets (i.e., politicians’ pictures, ideological words and items
referred to political ingroup/outgroup) in order to systematically
investigate the bias. We thought that the use of politicians’
pictures was particularly important because of personalization
(McAllister, 2007), i.e., the process by which electors come to
rely more on personality-related variables of political leaders
than on ideologies, policies and political programs (Katz and
Mair, 1995; Caprara and Vecchione, 2016). Indeed, thanks to
the increasing influence of TV and social media over the last
two decades, the relationship between electors and politicians
has been fundamentally shaped by the latter’s appearance.
We hypothesized that the personalization process, together with
one’s sensitivity toward authority, would drive the categorization
of politicians’ pictures (Study 1), resulting in a higher bias for
right-wing participants, while the other two stimuli -ideological
words (Study 2) and written items referring to left and right-
wing people (Study 3)- would induce a comparable bias in the
two groups. In contrast with studies indicating that intergroup
bias is stronger in Conservatives, our results showed left-wing
participants to be more biased than right-wing ones, who did not
express any bias in two of the three studies. It is worth noting
that a prior study using surveys, focus groups and interviews also
found more bias in left-wing Italian voters than in right-wing
ones (Catellani, 2006). Yet our results could be explained by the
plasticity of the personalization process, which relies on the real,
moment-by-moment social status of ingroup/outgroup political
leaders. This would be in keeping with our previous research
showing that right-wing people, differently from left-wing ones,
reduce their leader-voter perceived similarity and their tendency
to follow the gaze of the leader according to his/her social status
(Porciello et al., 2016). We speculate that right-wing participants,
being more sensitive to authority (Altemeyer, 1998) and social
hierarchies than left-wing ones (Tilly et al., 2001), may take
their leaders’ current social status into account when evaluating
them. The fact that there was a left-wing government during
data collection may explain why, when politicians’ pictures were
presented in Study 1, right-wing participants did not show
ingroup favoritism.
In Study 2, where ideological words were employed,
intergroup bias was present in both left and right-wing
participants. This result could be explained by the fact that words
do not initiate the personalization process, allowing ideological
opposition and the subsequent emotional activation to prevail,
and intergroup bias to occur in both groups. Interestingly,
though, left-wing participants’ bias was actually greater than
the one expressed by right-wing participants, showing either
more ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation. Study 3
provides clues on the factors that could have played a role
in the different expression of the political intergroup bias
in the two groups. We asked participants to answer items
containing an emotional, cognitive and behavioral evaluation
of the political ingroup/outgroup. Left-wing participants again
showed a higher bias than right-wing ones at the emotional
and cognitive levels, but no differences between the two
groups were found in the behavioral domain. However,
there are at least two problems with this measure: first,
by referring to the intention to act in a certain manner
rather than expressing an actual behavior, it might be
influenced by experimenter demand effects. Second, as for
every other aspect in the present study, we used a self-
report measure, which suffers from limitations that have been
deeply acknowledged in social psychology literature, such as
participants’ social desirability and scarce introspection skills
(Nisbett and Wilson, 1977). In addition, the two questions
that we presented lacked specific contextual information (e.g.,
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how much money they had before donating), which might
have decreased the sensitivity of the measure and, thus, made
it hard to justify such a deliberate and morally relevant
decision.
Conversely, when asked to express an emotional evaluation
and to assign positive or negative traits to the ingroup and
outgroup, left-wing participants again showed a greater bias,
particularly in the form of outgroup derogation. With this regard,
in keeping with research on morality-based groups (Halevy
et al., 2011; Parker and Janoff-Bulman, 2013; Weisel and Böhm,
2015) and on sacred values (Tetlock, 2003; Ginges et al., 2007),
we found outgroup derogation as the predominant expression
of the bias throughout the three studies. In fact, differences
between political groups are based on moral values that are
considered as “sacred,” that is transcendent from any trade-
off or contamination with other values (Tetlock et al., 1996;
Parker and Janoff-Bulman, 2013). When these moral values are
perceived as conflicting or being violated people experience
threat (Weisel and Böhm, 2015). In turn, threat leads to strong
outgroup derogation, which in some cases assumes the form of
moral outrage, namely a state characterized by particular negative
emotions (e.g., anger and contempt) and behaviors (e.g., harsh
punishment) (Tetlock, 2003). Relatedly, we found a mediating
role of perceived threat of the outgroup at the emotional level
of the bias. This result, which is in line with previous research
(Brandt et al., 2014), supports the idea that when the ingroup
is threatened the motivation to protect the group (as well as
one’s self) leads to express especially negative emotions toward
the source of the threat, namely the outgroup. We also tested
whether other variables besides threat could have played a role
in the regulation of this process, possibly by interacting with
perceived threat. We focused on perceived entitativity (the extent
to which a group is perceived as a group; Campbell, 1958) and
agentivity (the extent to which a group is perceived as able
to act as a group to achieve its goals; Abelson et al., 1998)
(referred to ingroup and the outgroup), because these variables
were observed to modulate the intergroup bias in minimal and
natural groups (see e.g., Gaertner and Schopler, 1998; Rubini
et al., 2007; Effron and Knowles, 2015). On the one hand,
we hypothesized that the more an outgroup is perceived as
an acting group, the more participants would show outgroup
derogation. On the other, we hypothesized that perceiving the
ingroup as entitative and agentive could have increase ingroup
favoritism.
No group difference or indirect effects of these two variables
in mediating the relationship between the political group
and the emotional and cognitive bias were found, making
any further speculation regarding their role in influencing
the intergroup bias impossible. We expected a bigger sense
of entitativity attributed to the right-wing also because of
the historical divisions characterizing Left-wing parties in
Italy. This somewhat surprising result might be explained
by the political situation at the time of the data collection.
In facts, after the 2014 political elections, both the big
center-right coalition guided by “Popolo della Libertà” and
the center-left one guided by “Partito Democratico” started
fragmentizing into smaller parties, an event that could have
undermined the sense of unity both in right and left-wing
voters.
To sum up, our studies suggest that: (i) in the Italian context
left-wing people express in general more intergroup bias than
right-wing people do; (ii) left- and right wings, show equal
prejudice when the oppositional nature is made salient (as
suggested by the ideological conflict hypothesis or the studies on
the sacred values, (Tetlock, 2003; Brandt et al., 2014); (iii) the left-
wing people’s higher prejudice seems to be mediated by perceived
threat of the outgroup (as shown in Study 3); (iv) the inability
of politicians’ pictures and political items to induce the bias in
right-wing participants may have been due to their sensitivity to
the authority of ingroup leaders, who were not in charge at the
time of the study.
Thus, by showing that political intergroup bias might depend
less on being left or right-wing per se than on the wider political
situation, the proposed model is useful in describing the political
context in Italy, where the left-wing has historically been weak
(Vampa, 2009). The last three decades, in particular, which have
seen left-wing parties across Europe transform from “catch-all
parties” to “cartel-parties” (i.e., parties that are controlled and
managed by professional politicians as an instrument aimed
specifically at winning the elections; Vampa, 2009) has driven the
Italian left-wing to renounce a part of its political identity. An
open crisis and loss of consensus has resulted (Vampa, 2009),
perhaps lessening the threat of the Left as perceived by the
Right. On the other hand, we might speculate that the loss of
the original political identity by the Left could, in turn, affect its
voters by undermining their political (and social) identity. In this
view, intergroup bias, might be just one strategy to reaffirm one’s
own identity (Brewer, 1999). Moreover, 2008 crisis has produced
economic and social instability that has contributed to growing
populism in Italy as well as all over the world. Most of these
populistic political movements seem to have their roots in the
right-wing ideology (see for instance “Golden Dawn” in Greece,
“Lega Nord” in Italy and “Le Front National” in France). Thus,
their spreading might have contributed to an increase of the
perception of threat and, in turn, of outgroup derogation by
left-wing people. Extreme examples of this are represented by
the episodes reported by Italian Media of assaults by left-wing
activists during right-wing manifestations (e.g., Frignani, 2016)1.
All in all, our results seem to support the ideological conflict
hypothesis (Brandt et al., 2014), which states that groups express
prejudice toward each other because of perceived ideological
dissimilarity and the perceived threat of the outgroup (Brandt
et al., 2014; Crawford and Pilanski, 2014). In addition to this, our
research has demonstrated the importance of how the ideological
message is conveyed since it can make the emergence of the bias
more or less likely.
Limitations and Future Directions
Although confirming solid recent findings and extending these
contributions in an intriguing way, the present results should
be taken with caution. The relative small sample size and the
specificity of the context in which data were collected, should
1https://roma.corriere.it
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push researchers to look for further evidence that could be
generalized or compared to other contexts. For instance, in
countries with a bi-party system (e.g., United States) or with a less
polarized political context (e.g., Germany, where left and right-
wing parties lean more toward the center) researchers might
find different results either with respect to the asymmetry that
we found on political bias but also regarding how different
stimuli are able to convey a certain ideology. Moreover, our study
focused on the Left-Right ideological dichotomy and we did not
investigate the single parties because of the high fragmentation of
the current Italian political context. Future studies might focus
on the political intergroup bias at the single party level. This
would be particularly relevant because the last elections showed a
fragmented political scenario in which a new – and ideologically
not clearly defined-political movement gained a large consensus
(e.g., the “Movimento 5 Stelle” became the first party; Ministero
dell’Interno, 2018)2. Relatedly, the complexity of the current
political Italian context might be reflected in different expression
of the bias depending on what parties are compared. This might
result in different outcomes with respect to what we found by
comparing ideologies rather than parties. Future studies should
also take into account variables different from those considered
in our studies (i.e., perceived threat, entitativity, and agentivity).
In facts, the partial mediation resulting from our model suggests
that other variables may be at play in the process. Ingroup
identification, for example, can moderate responses to threat,
leading people who strongly identify with their ingroup to be
more sensitive to those threats undermining the distinctiveness
or values of the ingroup itself (Voci, 2006). Moreover, people who
strongly identify with the ingroup showed greater bias toward
the outgroups (Hodson et al., 2003; Jetten et al., 2004; Schmid
and Muldoon, 2015). Thus, one further explanation of the
difference found in the perceived threat between the two political
groups could be that right-wing people might identify less with
their ingroup than left-wing people, showing less threat and
consequently a lower bias. On the same line, political involvement
could be another factor to consider since it might signal ingroup
identification which, in turn, might affect the expression of the
bias (Hodson et al., 2003; Jetten et al., 2004). Self-esteem, may
also play a role, as people with low self-esteem may be more
sensitive to threat directed at their own group; as a consequence,
they could be more likely to protect the self by expressing ingroup
favoritism (possibly also outgroup derogation) as posited by the
Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979).
Another important limitation of the present work that might
have prevented us to find results also at the behavioral level
is the use of self-report measures. Asking directly to people
about their psychological mechanisms is something that have
been acknowledged to impair reliability and even the expression
of some effects because of their tendency to convey a positive
image of themselves (i.e., social desirability) and because of their
poor introspective abilities (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977). Future
studies might overcome this issue by combining more implicit
measures (e.g., IAT Greenwald et al., 1998, or the AMP Payne
et al., 2005; Greenwald et al., 2009) and by employing tasks
2http://elezioni.interno.gov.it/camera/scrutini/20180304/scrutiniCI
addressing directly the behavior of interest, such as economic
investment games, e.g., dictator and trust game or prisoner’s
dilemmas (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965; Bolton et al., 1998;
Diekmann, 2004; Halevy et al., 2006).
As a final remark, while gender differences may in principle
play a relevant role in intergroup relations, studies on this issue
does not provide univocal results. Indeed, on the one hand, there
is evidence highlighting how men show higher intergroup bias
than women (Hewstone et al., 2002), possibly because of men’s
higher social dominance tendencies (Pratto et al., 2011); on the
other hand, other studies indicate that females express more
ingroup bias when facing other females because their balanced
gender identity allows them to have a cognitive mechanism that
promotes own-group preferences (Rudman and Goodwin, 2004).
Moreover, as predicted by ideological conflict hypothesis, when
political groups are confronted (like in each of our three studies)
intergroup bias should be equally expressed because conflicting
values of the outgroup lead to perceive it as threatening (Brandt
et al., 2014). In this regard, past research showed that females
seem to be more sensitive to social cues and to threatening
stimuli (McClure et al., 2004). Thus, we might speculate that
left-wing females would perceived the political outgroup as
more threatening and, in turn, express higher intergroup bias
than their male counterparts. Despite interesting, the present
research could not address this relevant issue; first because of its
intrinsic characteristics (i.e., for certain stimuli that we used, such
as ideological word, ingroup–outgroup own-gender preferences
exhibited by females could not be tested because sex-based
evaluations are not possible), second because of limitations due
to our sample size.
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APPENDIX
STUDY 1
Right-Wing Politicians:
Angelino Alfano, Mara Carfagna, Nunzia De Girolamo, Maurizio Gasparri, Maria Stella Gelmini, Ignazio La Russa, Roberto Maroni,
Giorgia Meloni, Alessandra Mussolini, Stefania Prestigiacomo, Laura Ravetto, Antonio Razzi, Matteo Salvini, Daniela Santanchè,
Denis Verdini, Anna Maria Bernini, Laura Comi, Micaela Biancofiore, Beatrice Lorenzin, Clemente Mastella, Silvio Berlusconi,
Roberto Formigoni, Maurizio Lupi, Pier Ferdinando Casini, Mario Borghezio, Roberto Calderoli, Renato Brunetta, Paolo Romani,
Raffaele Fitto, Umberto Bossi.
Left-Wing Politicians:
Nicola Vendola, Pierluigi Bersani, Rosaria Bindi, Laura Boldrini, Maria Elena Boschi, Paola Concia, Giuseppe Civati, Stefano Fassina,
Anna Finocchiaro, Marianna Madia, Ignazio Marino, Matteo Renzi, Emma Bonino, Simona Bonafè, Paola Picerno, Alessandra
Moretti, Federica Mogherini, Stefania Giannini, Giuliano Poletti, Paolo Gentiloni, Antonio Di Pietro, Dario Franceschini, Graziano
Delrio, Walter Veltroni, Romano Prodi, Enrico Letta, Giorgio Napolitano, Sergio Mattarella.
STUDY 2
Right-Wing Words∗∗:
Tradition, Hierarchy, Authority, Competition, Conservatism, Control, Dominance, Order, Conformity, Preservation, Religiosity,
Safety, Chastity, Obedience, Patriotism, Nationalism, Certainty, Dogmatism, Convention, Stability, Meritocracy, Protection,
Individuality.
Left-Wing Words∗∗:
Progress, Cooperation, Hospitality, Assistance, Help, Multiculturalism, Peace, Mobility, Equality, Liberalism, Change, Reform,
Flexibility, Tolerance, Secularism, Community, Diversity, Solidarity, Freedom, Sharing, Ecology, Redistribution, Innovation.
∗∗words were presented in Italian, here translated in English.
STUDY 3
Entitativity items∗: rated on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely).
(a) “Some groups have more the “group characteristics” than others do. To what extent do left/right-wing people qualify as a
‘group’?”
(b) “To what extent do you think left/right-wing people feel that they are part of their group?”
(c) “How cohesive are left/right-wing people?”
(d) “How organized are left/right-wing people?”
(e) “How much group unity do you think left/right-wing people feel?”
(f) “How much do left/right-wing people interact with one another?”
(g) “To what extent are left/right-wing people interdependent (i.e., dependent on each other) for achieving the group’s goals?”
(h) “How important is the group to left/right-wing people?”
Agentivity items∗: rated on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely).
(a) “To what extent are left/right-wing people able to influence other people (i.e., non-Conservatives/Liberals)?”
(b) “To what extent are left/right-wing people able to achieve their goals?”
(c) “To what extent are left/right-wing people able to act collectively?”
(d) “To what extent can left/right-wing people make things happen (e.g., produce outcomes)?”
Perceived Threat items∗: rated on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
(a) “If left/right-wing people were to take power, they would work towards the benefit of their group.”
(b) “I feel threatened when left/right-wing people are in power in Italy”
(c) “In certain areas I would be afraid of being identified as left/right-wing people.”
(d) “When I see left/right-wing people symbols in an area, I feel as though my left/right-wing people identity is under threat.”
(e) “I feel threatened when left/right-wing people express their identity and celebrate their cultural traditions.”
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∗Adaptation from the original items. Items were then translated and presented to participants in Italian.
Emotional Intergroup Bias∗∗: rated on a 7 points scale with the two words representing the extremes of the scale.
Warmth-Coldness, Negativity-Positivity, Friendliness-Hostility, Suspicion-Trust, Respect-Contempt, Admiration-Disgust.
Cognitive Intergroup Bias∗∗: rated on a 10 points scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 10 (very much) (Chambers and Melnyk,
2006).
Intelligent, Trustworthy, Honest, Ignorant, Friendly, Stubborn, Aggressive, Ethical, Considerate, Immoral, Tolerant, Radical.
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